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The need to ask for unemployment-insurance
benefits is an unhappy prospect for some unem-
ployed Americans, yet it is a necessity for many
and may be a way oflife for others who (deliber-
ately or not) have a long wait between jobs.
Benefit payments, aside from providing income
maintenance for the unemployed, may also have
helped increase the supply of labor over time.
Some individuals who lose their jobs might
otherwise leave the labor force, were it not for
benefit payments which reduce the cost of
searching for another suitable job. Certain un-
employed persons, on the other hand, may
report job search in order to receive jobless
benefits (and be counted in the labor force)
although no attempt is made to secure employ-
ment. Other individuals mightsearchfor season-
al or intermittent employment in order to be
eligible for benefits, when the income from such
employment alone would not be sufficient to
warrant labor-force participation.
This article analyzes the economic factors
which have contributed to cyclical variations in
labor-force participation rates since 1950. Our
primary purpose is to measurethe impact, ifany,
of the unemployment-insurance (Ul) program
upon the aggregate labor-force participation
rate. Certain simplifying assumptions are made
about the growth of population and labor-force
participation. For example, we estimate the
supply of labor from given population meas-
ures, and account for the secular behavior in
laborforce participationwithasimple time trend
and with a series which measures the number of
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young children (5 and under) as a percentage of
the adult population. The increase in the latter
factor has helped account for the increasing
participation rate of females, which in turn has
been the major reason for the rising trend in the
aggregate labor-force participation rate in the
postwar period.
Our analysis indicates that U1 payments to
individuals have acted to increase the supply of
labor over time and to weaken the familiar
"discouraged worker" effect. According to the
latter hypothesis, an increase in unemployment
signals an increase in the difficulty and cost of
finding a suitable job, causing some unemploy-
ed workers to become discouraged and withdraw
from the labor force-and to await a time when
jobs are more plentiful and the cost of finding
work is reduced. However, the payment of
unemployment-insurance benefits may actually
keep unemployed workers in the laborforce. Our
analysis suggests that, considering both the cost
of finding a job and the payments of jobless
benefits, there is far less responsiveness oflabor
as a group to changes in unemployment rates
than previous estimates of the discouraged-
worker effect have suggested.
In addition, the statistical results indicate that
since the late 1960's there has been achange in
the net response of labor to cyclical changes in
the average real wage rate. From the late 1940's
and into the 1960's, labor-force participation
generally declined whenever current real wage
rates were perceived as temporarily high, imply-
ing a diminished need for additional family
members to supplement income as the pay ofthe
main earner rose. However, this negative labor-
supply response to transitory wage changes has
diminished over time, and has even become
slightly positive since 1967. Some labor market
observers have suggested that the growth inlabor supply will slow down as real wages rise in
the current recovery, since the increased family
income implied by the higher wage rate will
permit supplementary household workers to
return to nonmarket pursuits. Our results indi-
cate that this is not likely to happen. Thetenden-
cy ofsome individuals to leave the laborforce as
real wages rise appears to have been offset since
1967 by the behaviorofothers who want to take
aQvantage of the higher real wages. Section I
provides the conceptual framework for our
labor-force participation model, and Section II
provides the estimated results of that model.
J. A Model of Labor Force Participation-
Conceptuai Framework
The underlying notions of the labor-supply
model in this paper come from the established
economic theory of consumer behavioL I Ac-
cording to this theory, individual choices with
regard to labor supply concern the division of
time between market activity and nonmarket
activity-the former includingbothworkingand
looking for a job, and the latter including all
other activities, such as child care, cooking,
eating, housework and leisure time in general.
The individual's allocation of time will be influ-
enced by the net real income (that is, dollars of
constant purchasing power) which his or her
services can command in the marketplace. Three
elements are considered in this paper to enter
into the calculation of that net income: the real
wage rate, the cost offinding a suitablejob, and
the payment of unemployment insurance ben-
efits.
Real wages
In the first instance, an increase in the real
wage rate which an individual expects to receive
in the market increases the cost to him ofspend-
ing time in nonmarket pursuits. Normally, a
change in the real wage rate will alter the alloca-
tion of an individual's time, so that different
quantities oflaborservices will be offered on the
market at different real wage rates.
The individual's reaction to a change in real
wages, however, will depend upon how perma-
nent thechange isexpected tobe. Putdifferently,
any change in real wage rates may be considered
as made up of "permanent" and short-lived,
"transitory" components. Two separate hypoth-
eses can be used to explain labor's reaction to
wage changes. The first is the permanent wage
effect, analyzed in the work of Milton Fried-
man.2 According to this effect, workers will plan
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their laboractivitytocoincide with periods when
the current actual wage is high relative to their
perception of some "normal" or "permanent"
wage. This hypothesis implies that if current
wages (W) are rising relative to normal real
wages (W*)-that is, if the ratio W/w* is
increasing-more labor will be supplied.
An alternative hypothesis is the relative wage
effect, described in the works ofRichard Easter-
lin and Michael WachteL3 According to this
hypothesis, the ratio (W/ W*) represents a rela-
tive standard-of-living variable; that is, it meas-
ures today's standard of living, which is repre-
sented by current wages (W), in relation to the
expected standard (W*). When current stand-
ards ofliving are rising relative to thoseexpected
on the basis of past experience-that is, when
W/W* is increasing-workers may choose more
nonmarket activity rather than work in the
market. This choice may show up, for example,
in thewithdrawalofsupplementaryfamily work-
ers from the labor market when the wage ofthe
main family earner increases. Conversely, when
the current standard ofliving falls relative to the
expected standard, secondary workers may be
induced to sacrifice nonmarket activity to enter
the labor market to supplement the family in-
come. The impact of an increase in the ratio of
CUrrent topermanentwages uponthe labor-force
participation rate thus may be either positive or
negative, depending on whichever is the domi-
nant influence-the permanent-wage effect or
the standard-of-living effect.
Cost ofsearch and unemployment benefits
Ordinarily,anindividualmakinga labor-force"
decision will have to spend some time and effort
searching for a suitable job. We may infer that
the individual, in offering labor services, hasconsidered both the cost oflooking for ajoband
the expected market wage from a prospective
job. We may also infer that the net benefits of
market activity to the individual are at least
equal to the benefits he would obtain by staying
at home-or, more precisely, engaging in non-
market activity. An increase in the cost ofsearch-
ing for a job reduces the expected net benefits
from market activity, and could thus lead to a
decline in labor-force participation.
The availability of unemployment-insurance
(UI) benefits also enters into the calculations of
an individual's expected cost of job search.
Unemployed workers may consider UI benefits
as an offsetting payment to the direct cost ofjob
search. By reducing the individual'ssearchcosts,
UI payments increase the net benefits expected
from market activity. An increase in UI pay-
ments, therefore, tendsto offsetthediscouraged-
worker effect and to strengthen labor-force par-
ticipation.4
Some individuals also may be attracted into
the labor force by the prospect of receiving
benefits after a short period ofemployment. UI
payments mayencourageseasonalorotherinter-
mittent employment when the wages available
from employment alone are not sufficient to
warrant labor-force participation. For this rea-
son too, we mayexpect the labor-force participa-
tion rate to increase when jobless benefits are
increased.5
We could reason that, to the extent the pro-
gram is self-financing, UI payments should not
impact upon the labor supply. According to this
argument, the payments have already been in~
corporated into the individual's expected wages.
Although benefits are paid by the employer, they
are considered the same as other employeebene-
fits which are deducted from theemployee's total
wage. At least in the short run, however, individ-
uals may not consider their contribution to the
insurance program as being a self-financing
matter. Although the program was intended to
be self-financing, it has not been so for the past
several years of high unemployment.6
In addition, most state laws create a rather
loose relationship between the benefits received
by an unemployed worker and the payments
made on his behalf. Consequently,as theaverage
covered wage increases, the maximum weekly
benefit also increases. In such a case, however,
revenues to finance the system do not increase
proportionately, because the taxable wage base
increases much more slowly than averagewages.
Forthese reasons, benefit payments in theirown
right tend to affect labor-force participation
decisions.
Our argument thus suggests that changes in
the aggregate labor-force participation rate de-
pend upon changes (both permanent and tem-
porary) in real wage rates, the cost ofjobsearch,
and unemployment-insurance benefits. An in-
crease in the cost of job search would tend to
reduce the participationrate, while anincrease in
UI payments would tend to increase the labor
supply. The wage effect upon labor supply is less
certain, depending upon the relative importance
of the permanent or relative wage effect. If the
latter is dominant, changes in the supply of
labor-in response to temporary changes in
wages-may be the result of supplementary
family members moving in and out ofthe labor
force in an effort to maintain the family's accus-
tomed standard ofliving. On the other hand, the
growing importance of women in the labor
force-particularly married women whose work
experience indicates an increased attachment to
full-year participationS-detracts from the im-
portance of the relative wage hypothesis. Since
the two hypotheses we have considered imply
different signs on the wage coefficients, we can
test in our model to see whicheffect is dominant.
II. Estimation of Labor Supply Model
It is seldom an easy matter to proceed from a
general theoretical framework to a specific re-
gression which can be estimated from available
historicaldata. Themodel described above needs
several adjustments before empirical estimation
can proceed. Thediscussion ofthose refinements
is followed by the estimation results (including
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forecast results) and a summary oftheirimplica-
tions.
From theory to testing
There are no historical data which directly
measure the cost of job search. In general,changes in the unemployment rate have been
used in laborsupply studies to signaLchanges in
the numberofjobsavailable, with anincrease in
unemployment,forexample, indicating an in-
crease in the cost and difficulty offinding a job.
In this paper, the unemployment rate of prime
age males (25-54) is used to represent the cost of
finding ajobsincethis rate, morethanany other,
reflects cyclical changes injobopportunitiesand
in the overall demand for labor. This is because
the supply of prime age males (from a given
population) is relatively insensitive to cyclical
economic conditions so that changes in their
unemployment rate basically reflect changes in
job opportunities and in the demand for laborin
generaI.9
Our model attempts to explain the aggregate
behavior of different population groups. De-
mographic changes in the population, in particu-
lar changes in the agelsex distribution, may well
affect labor participation behavior over time in
ways not captured by the model. To handle this
aggregation problem we have used the share of
prime age males (25-54) in the population(MIX)
to measuretheimpact ofchanges in population
composition upon participation decisions in the
estimation period, 1950.1 to 1974.4. In particu-
lar, we have permittedthevariableMIXtoaffect
both the relative-wage and unemployment-rate
effects on the. labor-force participation rate,
entering those two explanatory variables with
coefficients ofthe form (a+b MIX) where a and
b are estimated constants. IO
In addition, we have
unemployment-insurance benefits variable
(UIB) in the labor-supply equation as a measure
affecting the unemployment rate's impact upon
the labor supply. We would expect a rise in UIB
to keep more people in the labor force to the
extent the unemployment rate increases; that is,
the greater are the number of individuals faced
with the work-nonmarket activity decision.
Thus, to account for the effects ofboth MIXand
VIB, the unemployment rate (RU) is written in
the form RU'=(a+bMIX +cUIB)RU, wherea, b
and c are estimated constant coefficients. In
other words, the unemploymentimpactuponthe
labor-force participation rate will vary overtime
Chart 1
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38with changes in the population (MIX) and
changes in unemployment benefits (UIB).
The actual value of UI payments in the esti-
mated regression is anindex ofthe relative size of
benefits. Specifically, the variable VIB is the
maximum average weekly benefit, stated as a
percentage of the average weekly spendable
wages of a worker with three dependents in the
nonfarm private business sector (Chart I).!!
Unemployment benefits have increased from
about 50.5 percent ofspendableearningsin 1950
to 69.4 percent in 1976.3, butthe rise hasacceler-
ated in recent years. The increase from 1973.1 to
1976.3 was by far the greatest for any four-year
period since 1948. 12
To estimate permanent wages (W*), we have
assumed that the permanent real wage rate in a
given period is equal to a percentage ofthe trend
level of labor productivity. That percentage is
equal to labor's sharein total output produced-
a relatively constant measure over time. The
details ofthe procedure used to calculate W* are
given in the appendix.
Although we areconcerned with short-termor
business cycle variations in the labor-force parti-
cipation rate, the labor-supply data incorporate
both trend and short-term movements, which
means we must devise some way ofadjustingfor
trend. The rise in the aggregate labor-force
participation rate in the postwar period reflects
the dramatic increase in the female participation
rate. 13 Women's labor-force participation tends
to be associated with the number of small chil-
dren in the family, so to pick up that factor, we
have included in the regression model the num-
ber of children 5 years old and under as a
percentage ofthe adult population. Thatpercen-
tage, which began to decline sharply in the mid-
1960's, apparently accounts for a significant
amount ofchange in the aggregate participation
rate. Also, that percentage apparentlyserves as a
useful proxy for several other related influences
which have had an important influence upon
female labor supply-such as the trend toward
later marriages and the rise in female-education
levels-but which we have not attempted to
estimate separately.
To capture additional secular forces influenc-
ing the aggregate participation rate, we have
chosen a nonlinear time trend (1/ time, where
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time = 13 in 1950.1 and 119 in 1976.3). This time
trend was the most statistically significant ofthe
several considered, and it has thedesirable long-
run property of approaching a value of zero as
time progresses. This is a desirable property; the
participation rate has a maximum value ofone
and a time trend without a limitation on the
values it can assume would implya participation
rate with possible values greater than one.
FinCllly, we have assumed that the supply of
labor from a given population responds to both
current and past changes in the economic de-
terminants included in the equation. The time
adjustment model which proved moststatistical-
ly significant was one in which the supply of
labor responds to past changes in the different
economic determinants with the same distribut-
ed lag pattern. In the conventional way, we have
incorporated this behavior by entering the




ed over the 1950.1-1974.4 period, appears to
explain the movements in thelabor-forcepartici-
pation rate quitewell. The adjustedcoefficient of
determination (R2) of .95 means that about 95
percent of the variation in the aggregate labor-
force participation rate can be accounted for by
the model. The standard error of.24 percentage
points indicates a very close fit between actual
and estimated values, since this error represents
only.3 percent ofthe mean labor-force participa-
tion rate (69.9 percent) over the sample period.
LFPR t = 28.1644 - 9.70906TT - (2.34380 - 6.61831 MIX t
(5.27) (-2.30) (-3.15) (3.16)
.00969 UlBt) RU t + (.996122 - 4.08348MIXt)(- W )
(2.40) (2.82) (-2.87) w* t
- .204513N5 t + .64834ILFPRt_1
(-4.34) (9.52)
Adjusted iP = .95
Durbin Watson = 2.11
Standard Error = .24
Mean LFPR = 69.9
Estimation Period 1950.1-1974.4
Numbers in parentheses are t statisticswhere
LFPR= labor force participation rate of aU
persons between the ages of 16 and 64, in
percent
MIX =numbers of males in the population
between the ages of 25 and 54 divided by
the total population 16 years and over, in
percent
UlB = maximum weekly benefits payable un-
der the unemployment-insurance system,
divided by spendable average weekly earn-
ings of production worker with 3 depend-
ents, in percent
Chart 2
RU =rate ofunemploymentofmales between
the ages of 25 and 54, in percent.
W/w* =current real wages ofemployees innon-
farm private domestic business sector,
divided by normal wage, in percent
TT= l/Time - Time is equal to 13 in 1950.1 and
112 in 1974.4
N5 = number of children 5 years old and under
in the population, divided by number of
people 16 years old and over in this popula-
tion, in percent
The more pertinent test for a model, however,

















1976dependent variable after the estimation period.
The years 1975 and 1976 provide a particularly
good test, since that period incorporated a con-
siderable amount ofvariation in labor behavior,
including (in 1976) the highest labor-force parti-
cipation rate on record (Chart 2).
The model performed very well overthe post-
sample period, especially by capturing the unu-
sual 1976 increases in laborsupply(Table 1). The
mean absolute forecast errorfor the seven quar-
ters (1975.1-1976.3) is .17 percentage points,
while the average error is only -.07 percentage
points; both are well within the .24 standard
errorofthe equation over the estimation period.
The movementovertime in the supplyoflabor
has been dominated by population growth,
along with other long-run changes which have
produced a shift in preferences between work
and nonmarket activity. The strong trend-like
movement in the labor-forceparticipationrate is
captured in the model by the time trend, the
constant term, N5(thechildren!adultratio), and
the lagged dependent variable. To determine the
statistical significance of the cyclical economic
variables, we re-estimated the model with only
the time trend, constant, N5 and lagged depend-
ent variables, and then compared the unex-
plained variation in the participation rate from
this abbreviated model with that of the full
model (equation I). The additional variables
included in the full model were found to reduce
the unexplained variance in the participation
rate by 20 percent. In addition, a statistical test
indicated that this reductionrepresenteda statis-
tically significant decrease in the unknown vari-
ance in the labor-force participation rate. 15 We
can thus conclude that the wage, unemployment
and unemployment-insurance variables account
for a significant amount ofcyclical variation in
labor-supply behavior.
Table 1
Labor Force Participation Rate of
Population aged 16-64
Forecasts Outside the Estimation Period
1975.1-1976.3
labor Force Participation Rate
Forecasted- Actual Forecast Error
1975.1 72.170 72.155 .015
.2 71.933 72.449 -.516
.3 72.115 72.203 -.088
.4 72.012 71.932 .081
1976.1 72.146 71.896 .250
.2 72.185 72.369 -.184
.3 72.528 72.585 -.058
Mean Absolute Error, 1975.1-1976.3 .170
"Forecasts are outside the estimation period (1950.1--
1974.4) and have been calculated with all variables on the
right hand side of the equation equal to actual values. In a
dynamic ex-post simulation in which estimated values ofthe
lagged-dependent variable replace actual values, the mean
absolute error is .23 percentage points.
Table 2
Short-term Unemployment Coefficients for Selected Periods
Unemployment Rate-Prime Age Males:



















































(RU)and the wageterm(W/W*)vary over time
(Tables 2 and 3},andthe&ecoefficientsare
associated with thecurrentooquarterindependent
variable. The lagged dependent variable in our
equation means that some time is required for
labortoadjustftillytoachangeinan independ~
ent variable; ultimately, the ·long~run response
will be about 2.8 timeslarger-l/(1-.648)-than
the current coefficient estimate. Henceforth, we
will focusuponcurrent~quarter coefficient val~
ues, since this provides the essenceof labor~
supply behllVior. TheJonger~fl.I.n reaction can.be
derived easily, by multiplying the reported re~
sults by 2.8.
Our estimates indicate that the impact of
labor~market conditions-represented by the
prime~age male unemployment rate (RV)-on
the labor~force participation rate has varied
significantly over time. In particular, the supply
oflabor has become more sensitive tochanges in
labor~market conditions in the 1970's than was
evident twenty years ago (column I). Those
estimates measure the unemployment coeffi-
cient, excluding the effect of unemployment
insurance but including the response to demo~
graphic changes. The MIX variable (the propor-
tion of prime age males in the population) has
shown a secular decline since the early 1950's,
and this has increased the labor~supplyreaction
to changes in the unemployment rate. This
should be expected, since prime-age males are
less likely than others to move in and out ofthe
labor force in response tochangesinthecost and
difficulty offinding ajob. Thevalues in column I
indicate that a l~percentage point increase in
adult male unemployment would lead to a de-
Table 3






















cline intheaverage labor~force participationrate
of.524 percentage points in 1950.4, .709 percen-
tage points in 1965.4, and.769 percentage points
in 1976.
However, thenegative response oflabor sup~
ply to unemployment~rate changes has been
considerably reduced (in absolute terms) by the
payment of unemployment~insurancebenefits.
As the positive values in column 2 indicate, for
any given unemployment rate, an increase in VI
payll1entsleads to an increase in labor supply.
Forexample, in 1950.4, whentheunemployment
rate of prime~agemales was equal to3.0percent,
VI payments added 1.46 percentage pointsto the
participation rate (.485x3.0). If unemployment
conditions had remained unchanged, VIB would
have increased the participation rate by 1.74
percentage points in 1965.4 (.58Ix3.0); 1.91 per~
centage points in 1975.4; and 2.02 percentage
points in 1976.3.
Consideringthe opposing forces atwork-the
cost offinding a job and the payment to unem~
ployed workers-the total size ofthe unemploy-
ment coefficient (column 3) is considerably
smaller than it would be with no benefit pay-
ments (column 1). Thus, previous estimates of
the discouraged~worker effect may have over~
estimated the response of labor supply to
unemployment~ratechanges by not considering
the positive labor response to increases in VI
payments. Some labor studies have used an
employment rate rather than an unemployment
rate to represent job opportunities and the cost
of job search. Our results suggest that these
studies also may exaggerate the discouraged-
worker effect when the importance of VI pay-
ments is ignored. 17
The MIX variable also has affected the size of
the wage coefficient over time. The signs ofthe
coefficients indicate that the relative wage effect
had been dominant until the late 1960's. Vntil
1967, whenever wages fell relative to expected
income, the labor force increased as additional
entrants attempted to supplement the family's
desired standardofliving. Conversely, whenever
wages rose relative to expected income, supple-
mentary family workers left the labor force.
Subsequently, however, the relationships have
been reversed. Even more strikingly, the impact
of wages upon labor supply has diminishedconsiderably over time. The negative value of
.127 in the early 1950's haseven turned toa small
positive .024 in 1976.
The growing weakness in the relative wage
effect may be due to offsetting behavior by
different groups in the labor force. Since the
early 1950's, married women (with husbands
present) have accounted for a growing percent-
age ofthe laborforce. This group ofworkers has
shown an increasing attachment to the labor
force and has traditionally displayed a strong
positive response tochangesin theirwages. IS The
increasing importance of married women in the
laborforce may have offset the negative response
of other workers 'to temporary increases in the
average wage.
III. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the economic vari-
ables which determine cyclical behavior in labor
supply, with emphasis upon the influence of
unemployment-insurance benefits in the period
since 1950. The findings indicate that the pay-
ment of UI benefits has weakened the
discouraged-worker effect, so that when jobs
become difficult to find, less workers leave the
labor force (or are discouraged from entering)
than would be the case if no payments were
provided to the unemployed. Some individuals
might view an increase in VI payments as a
reduction in the cost ofsearching for a job and,
hence, as an inducement to remain in the labor
force as an unemployed worker rather than to
leave for nonmarket pursuits. Other individuals
might be encouraged to enter short-term em-
ployment when the wages alone from such work
would not be sufficient inducement to do so. Our
model does not distinguish between these or
other motivations. It simply suggests that the
impact of changes in labor-market conditions
should be considered a net response--oneallow-
ing for the cost offinding a job on the one hand
and payment of VI benefits on the other. Other-
wise, the unemployment/labor-supply relation-
ship will be overstated.
These findings have implications for the inter-
pretation of the official unemployment data
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Manyobservers questionthe use oftheaggregate
unemployment rate as an indicator of the
strength of the economy. Understanding the
economic picture requires understanding the
causes offluctuations in thejobless rate, such as
the labor-supply factors estimated here.
If the discouraged-worker effect is weaker
than originally thought, the unemployment rate
should have greater amplitude and conform
more closely with cyclical changes in aggregate
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output. Fewer workers would leave the labor
force during the recession and fewer wouldenter
during the recovery, so that changes in the
jobless rate would more likely reflect changes in
aggregate demand.
However, other economic conditions could
stimulate changes in the supplyoflaborand thus
interfere with this conformity. Increases in
unemployment-insurance benefits have tended
to add to the labor-force participation rate. For
example, an increase in UI benefits during an
economic downturn acts to increase the labor
supply, and thereby to increase the unemploy-
ment rate more than would be justified by
aggregate-demand conditionsalone. This behav-
ior helps to explain the unusual and largely
unexpected increases in the labor-force partici-
pation rate observed during last year's "pause."
The slowdown in final demand for goods and
services .which began early in 1976 acted to
moderate growth in labor supply. At the same
time, the maximum weekly UI payment in-
creased substantially, and thusacted tostimulate
increased labor-force participation. Theincrease
in the ratio between UI benefits and weekly
spendable earnings was unusually large, and the
increase between 1976.1 and 1976.3 may have
added about 145,000 workers to the labor force
and about .14 percentage points to the unem-
ployment rate in 1976.3.
In addition, the aggregate labor force has
shown little response to temporary changes in
the relationship between current and expected
real wages. However, this response may repre-
sent the offsetting behavior ofdifferent groups.
Indeed, it could become a stronger positive
factor in labor-supply growth ifmarried women
continue to increase their representation in the
labor force.APPENDIX I
For normal wages (W*), we assume that the
permanent real-wage rate in a given period of
time is equalto a percentage ofthe trend level of
labor productivity. The percentage is equal to
labor's share in total income produced (gross
business domestic product)-a ratio which has
been relatively constant over time. We rely upon
the relative constancy of this ratio to derive a
measure of normal wages.
This constancy can be represented as:
k :::: (Total Labor IncomeIGross Business
Domestic Product).
Totallabor income can be written as theaverage
wage per worker times the number of workers
(WxN);and Gross Business Domestic Product
ca.n<bewrittenasa measure ofthe average price
level times a measure of the real quantity of
output produced (PxQ). Or, rewriting the
above,k=(WxN)I(PxQ). This equation can be
rewrittenso that real wages (WIP) areexpressed
as a constant percentage (k) of the average
output of labor (QI N):
W/P = kx (Q/N).
To derive anestimate ofnormal orexpected real
wages (W*), we substitutethetrendlevel oflabor
productivity for the average output of labor,
which we designate as (QI N)'. Then w* = k x
(Q/N)'.
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